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OUTPATIENT MENTAL HEALTH CARE SERVICES-A MINOR'S
RIGHT
The 1979 Session of the General Assembly made important changes in
Title 54 of the Code of Virginia pertaining to health care for minors.' One
of the principal changes involved the right of unemancipated minors2 to
seek outpatient treatment for mental health problems without the consent
of their parents.3 Additionally, lawmakers deleted the criminal sanctions
imposed against medical practitioners who performed authorized abor-
tions on consenting minors.4 This bill appears to bring into Virginia a
partial realization of a child's right to due process and equal protection
under the law.'
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Traditionally, the parent was regarded as the final authority on the care
and upbringing of the child. The child was a chattel of the parent, regarded
1. The bill was sponsored by Senators F. T. Gray and J. Harry Michael, Jr. and added an
Article 7 to Chapter 12 of Title 54 of the Code of Virginia. Introduced as Senate Bill 661, the
version approved by the General Assembly was signed by Governor Dalton on April 2, 1979.
It will become effective on October 1, 1979 as VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.2.
2. The current law concerning consent to medical or surgical procedures generally regards
any person under 18 years of age who has been married as a minor and subject to parental
control. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.42 (Repl. Vol. 1979) and § 54-325.2(D). However, the law sets
out clearly delineated exceptions that allow the minor to be treated as an adult for treatment
of venereal disease, or other infectious disease; birth control, pregnancy or family planning;
substance abuse; and under the new provision: outpatient care or treatment "for mental
illness and emotional disturbance." Id.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.2(D)(4) (Cur. Supp. 1979).
4. Under the proposed senate bill, the law would have allowed medical treatment including
abortions for minors without parental consent but would have placedcriminal sanctions on
the attending physician for performing the medical procedure under VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
76 (Repl. Vol. 1975). This" section of the Virginia Code stands in direct opposition to the
Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See Note,
Sexual Privacy: Access of a Minor to Contraceptives, Abortion, and Sterilization without
Parental Consent, 12 U. RICH L. REv. 221, 236 (1977) which states: "it is clear that section
18.2-76 is unconstitutional at least as to the requirement of parental consent for an abortion
during the first trimester." Id., n. 91.
5. STAFF OF SENATE. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95th CONG., 2D SFSS., REPORT ON CONSTITU-
TioNAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (Comm. Print 1978). (hereinafter cited as JUDICIARY REPORT).
Senator Birch Bayh stated:
. . . that children should be protected by the Constitution, and in particular by the
Bill of Rights, is a new frontier. . . . [Those of us who support this movement hope
to establish that a child has the right to. . .adequate nutrition and medical care;. ..
to due process of law; to equal protection of the laws; and to privacy.
Id. at V.
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as an economic necessity in a mercantile society.' Even the great liber-
tarian thinkers of the last century had little regard for the rights of chil-
dren. John Stuart Mill noted:
[Children] are still in a state to require being taken care of by others [and]
must be protected against their own action as well as against external in-
jury. . . . Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things
anterior to the time when mankind have [sic] become capable of being
improved by free and equal discussion.7
In the event that the parents failed to exhibit proper control or were
deceased, the state assumed the role of the parent-parens patriae. As
economic conditions changed, the state began to impose external influ-
ences on the family, such as compulsory education and the restrictions on
child labor, which postponed the assumption of adult roles. 8 This delay in
attainment of the adult model resulted in a re-emphasis on the rights of
parents to control the actions and activities of the child, especially in areas
of education9 and religion."0
A. Parent's Right v. Children's Rights
It was not until the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder" that the Supreme Court
took notice of the fact that the desires of the child might not coincide with
those of the parents. One member of the Court noted that the child should
have some due process rights under the Constitution. Justice Douglas (dis-
senting in part) stated: "It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that
is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we have said about the
Bill of Rights and the right of students to be masters of their own des-
6. See P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD, 365-69 (1960); THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD 250-
251 (L. de Mause ed. 1974); Stem, Smith & Doolittle, How Children Used to Work, 39 LAw
& CONTEMP. PRoB. 93, 100-104 (1975). For an interesting analysis of the rights of children and
parents in 18th century England see 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 443 et seq. (1807).
7. J. MILL, ON LIEaRTY (D. Spitz ed. 1975), 13-14 as cited in JUDiCIA.Y REPORT, supra note
5, at 3, n. 8.
8. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
9. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (affirmed the right of parents to have their
children instructed in foreign languages); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(held unconstitutional a state law which "unreasonably interfere[dl with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of children under their control." Id. at 534-
35).
10. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (held that parental rights and religious free-
dom were sufficiently important to overcome a state requirement of compulsory school atten-
dance).
11. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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tiny."" The other members of the Court did not, however, share this con-
cern.
The majority opinion in Yoder placed greater emphasis on the rights of
the parents than on the rights of the child. Chief Justice Burger stated, in
dictum, that "an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of
religious training would give rise to grave questions of religious
freedom .. ."' In a more recent opinion, the Court has held that before
a state can interfere with the family interests and relationships there must
be a compelling interest." These decisions are generally considered to rep-
resent "parents' rights" which are entitled to constitutional protection.
Contrasted with the deference shown by the Supreme Court toward the
rights of parents over minors is the growing trend to acknowledge the rights
of children vis-a-vis the state. This trend was most clearly illustrated in
the case, In Re Gault,'" in which Justice Fortas wrote that "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."' 6 The
Court was careful to note, however, that these words were not to be inter-
preted as encompassing "the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and
the state," but were to be limited to the issue of that case, which involved
the commitment of a minor to a detention home."
B. The Balancing of Interests: Health Care
Recently, the Supreme Court further relaxed the firm line it had pre-
viously drawn on parental rights and family interests.'8 This time the
12. Id. at 245.
13. Id. at 231.
14. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (held that a city zoning ordinance
imposing definitional limitations upon extended families was unconstitutional). This case
relied upon previous "family" cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska, supra n. 10, Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, supra n. 10, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra n. 11. Although a 5-4 decision, each of
the Justices, except Justice Rehnquist, affirmed the "sanctity of the family" as espoused by
Justice Powell. Id. 431 U.S. at 503.
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id. See also Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of, In and For Children, 39 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROS. 118 (1975).
18. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S 52 (1976) (held parental consent provi-
sion in Missouri statute to be unconstitutional). This case first recognized the child's right
to privacy and clearly acknowledged that "[M]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Id. at 74. Constitutional rights "do not ma-
ture and come into being magically only when one attains the state defined age of maturity."
Id. See also, Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (affirming a
district court decision that held unconstitutional, under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, a New York law which made it a crime for any person to sell or distribute non-
1979]
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question was whether parents' rights can override the rights sought by
children which, but for their age, would be theirs under the Constitution.
The Court acknowledged that there might be a balancing of the rights of
adults and children;" indeed, the weighing of interests sometimes requires
that a child be allowed to make his own choices, especially where the
child's own body is involved. Thus, health services have generally evolved
as an area which might allow the minor to seek medical care as a matter
of right with or without parental consent.
II. THE NEW STATUTE
Virginia has enacted a law that will allow a child in certain instances to
seek and receive outpatient care without the consent of the parent.2 0 Under
prescription contraceptives to a minor under the age of sixteen). This case again addressed
the issue of a minor's right to privacy "in connection with decisions affecting procreation."
Id. at 693. The Court cited with approval the language of Danforth, supra that a State" 'may
not impose a blanket provision . . . requiring the consent of a parent. . . as a condition for
abortion during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy.' 428 U.S. at 74." Id.
19. "The State's interest in protecting a young person from harm justifies the imposition
of restraints on his or her freedom even though comparable restraints on adults would be
constitutionally impermissible." Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, supra at 102 (Stevens, J.
dissenting). Accord Carey v. Population Services International, supra at 693 n. 15 (stating
that the law regards minors as having a lesser capacity for making decisions than adults, with
the consequent result that the state has much greater latitude to regulate the conduct of
children). Compare Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions,
39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 8 (1975) (questioning whether there exists a general articulable
standard that the courts and legislatures can apply to provide comprehensive protection of
children's rights).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1979) states in full that:
A minor shall be deemed an adult for the purpose of consenting o:
1. Medical or health services needed to determine the presence of or to treat vener-
eal disease or any infectious or contagious disease which the State Board of Health
requires to be reported;
2. Medical or health services required in the case of birth control, pregnancy or
family planning except for the purposes of 54-325.3 through 54-325.6;
3. Medical or health services needed in the case of outpatient care, treatment or
rehabilitation for substance abuse as defined in § 37.1-203 of this Code;
4. Medical or health services needed in the case of outpatient care, treatment or
rehabilitation for mental illness or emotional disturbance.
21. Virginia case law does not appear to have recognized a right of racovery for failure to
obtain parental consent. A West Virginia case bearing on the subject is Browning v. Hoffman,
90 W.Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922) which states that "a surgeon has no legal right to operate
upon a patient without his consent or upon a child without the consent of its parent or
guardian." Id. at 497. Browning cited as authority a Texas case, Rishworth v. Moss, 191 S.W.
843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), which held that a parent could recover damages for the death of a
child from surgery not authorized by the parent. The court in Rishworth noted, however, that
had the child recovered, damages would have been limited to actual damages. Id. at 851. The
918
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section 54-325.2(D) a minor "is deemed an adult" when seeking such treat-
ment, and the potential liability of the physician for a tort suit initiated
by the parents for an unlawful touching has been removed.2 ' It also allows
the child to give "informed consent" to medical procedures that are inci-
dental to treatment for the disorder.
The most significant part of this new law, from a substantive point of
view, is its recognition of a minor's right to seek "medical or health services
needed in the case of outpatient care, treatment or rehabilitation for men-
tal illness or emotional disturbance." This portion of the law is new and
indicates a recognition by the General Assembly of a minor's right to
privacy in some aspects of his personal life. Additionally, it reaffirms the
right of a minor to seek certain health services regardless of parental de-
sires.
24
A. Extent of the Law
It is important to note that the minor may seek only,"outpatient care."
There are several broad reasons for this: (1) once admitted to a medical
treatment facility for mental or emotional disorders, a minor loses some
personal rights to choose the type and form of treatment, as well as the
right to terminate such treatment;2 and (2) Virginia does not have a statu-
age of the children in these cases was nine and eleven years, respectively. For an excellent
discussion as to whether the consent of a minor to surgical procedure will preclude a cause of
action for assault and battery, see Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956) (held
that a surgical procedure, even though beneficial or harmless, if performed on a minor without
parental consent, is a technical assault and battery for which the minor may recover nominal
damages).
22. This appears to be the more rational and generally accepted approach to obtaining
consent from a minor. Whether a court will consider the consent of a minor effective and
parental consent unnecessary depends upon such factors as the minor's age, his maturity,
marital status, emancipation, and certain public policy considerations. See, 1977 II HosPrrAL
LAW MANUAL § 4-2 (Aspen Systems Corporation). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 892A(1) (1979): "One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his
interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it."
(emphasis added). The comments indicate that effective consent can be granted by a minor
without parental consent:
If the person consenting is a child or one of deficient mental capacity, the consent may
still be effective if he is capable of appreciating the nature, extent and probable
consequences of the conduct consented to, although the consent of a parent, guardian
or other person responsible is not obtained or is expressly refused.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2), comment b (1979).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.2(D)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
24. Id.
25. "Mental health statutes do not reveal any significant difference between the rights of
voluntary and involuntary patients with respect to correspondence, visitation, mechanical
1979]
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tory process whereby a minor may voluntarily commit himself to an insti-
tution for treatment." By restricting the treatment to outpatients, the
legislators have wisely avoided potentially difficult problems which might
have been created by a broader statute.
As an outpatient, a minor may seek treatment without the consent or
knowledge of his parents; he also retains the option to terminate the treat-
ment at his own discretion. This provides the child with maximum flexibil-
ity and privacy in solving his personal problems. Whether the child can
consent to all types of treatment is, however, still unanswered. Can a child
give "informed consent" to receive pharmacological or electroshock
treatment? If so, at what age? The answers to these questions are unclear.
The Danforth decision cautioned that "[not] every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her preg-
nancy." 2 There must be some subjective balancing of the interests of the
child against the interests of the parents and government.2 It would seem
that particular facts and circumstances must be considered in each case
and that a broad general guideline would be both unwise and inappro-
priate .
29
B. Potential Problem Areas
There are potential problem areas that have not been resolved. The law
does not specify who is to bear the cost for treatment of unemancipated
minors when they seek and receive medical care without parental consent.
Additionally, it is unclear whether or not parents should have access to
medical files of the unemancipated children.
restraints, and the exercise of civil rights." Note, The Mental Hospitalization of Children and
the Limits of Parental Authority, 88 YALE L.J. 186, 188 n. 9 (1978).
26. Prior to 1976, children under 18 could be admitted to mental institutions without
judicial approval under VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-65 (Repl. Vol. 1976). Parents or persons stand-
ing in loco parentis could merely request admission of the child. Formal involuntary commit-
ment proceedings did not apply to children under 14. After Brown v. Allerton, No. 75-0450-
R (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 1976), the state Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation
agreed not to "voluntarily" admit allegedly mentally ill or mentally retarded juveniles except
under the procedures set forth in VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.1 (Repl. Vol. 1976) and if the
consent of the minor had been obtained.
27. 428 U.S. at 75.
28. JUDICIARY REPORT at 18. Compare Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process
Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAif. L. REv. 769 (1978)
(protection of children's rights by state support of parental decisions).
29. JUDICIARY REPORT at 18.
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1. Who pays for professional services?
In commercial transactions a minor enjoys a protected status. 0 There
are only limited circumstances under which he may make a binding con-
tract. Generally, he may not obligate himself and, if he does, he may later
disaffirm the transaction." Where medical services are the subject of the
contract, some states, such as New York, will not allow the minor, in
certain situations, to subsequently disaffirm the obligation.12 Virginia cur-
rently has no such legislation and therefore a question exists as to who will
bear the cost for treatment of a minor under section 54-325.2(D).
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that it is within the power of the
legislature to fix the minimum age at which a minor can enter into a
particular contract." The legislature therefore could allow minors not cov-
ered by a parent's medical insurance to make a binding contract with the
treating physician. In cases where medical insurance is available, the child
might be able to receive treatment under the parent's program without the
parent's consent. The physician could render treatment and receive com-
pensation directly from the insurer under the master policy. 4 It is doubtful
that under existing Virginia law any contract of the child for medical
services could be binding on the parent unless the parent expressly agreed
to that obligation under general surety principles. 5
There is some language in Virginia case law to indicate that an "infant
30. 9B MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE, Infants § 4 (Repl. Vol. 1977) states that infancy is no
defense against: (1) forfeiture of an estate for breach of an express condition; (2) contracts to
serve as apprentices; (3) contracts of enlistment; (4) reasonable partition or discharge of a
mortgage for payment of a debt where a minor is a tenant in common. See also VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-278 (Rep. Vol. 1977) which bars a plea of infancy where the minor is transacting
business as a trader or where the minor accepts loans to defray expenses of higher education.
31. As a general rule a minor's contracts are voidable and not void, and the minor may
affirm or disaffirm the contracts within a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority.
9B MICHIE JURISPRUDENCE, Infants § 3 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
32. N.Y. GEN. Oauo. LAW § 3-102 (Rep. Vol. 1977).
33. See Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S.E. 890 (1926); Strother v.
Lynchburg Trust and Sav. Bank, 155 Va. 826, 156 S.E. 426 (1931).
34. Under the current arrangement between Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Virginia and
its subscribing physicians, there is only a contractual relationship between the physician and
the corporation. Under the plan, the person who purchases the insurance coverage is a sub-
scriber and all eligible members of his household are "participants." Doctors are required to
render treatment to participants when needed, and then bill their services to Blue Cross and
Blue Shield. Even if the subscriber were to notify the corporation that he did not desire that
a bill be paid, the contract between physician and the corporation would still be honored.
Thus, a child who is a "participant" under this particular program can get treatment under
the subscriber's policy without the consent of the subscriber.
35. Stimpson v. Hunter, 234 Mass. 61, 125 N.E. 155 (1919).
19791
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may do acts for his benefit which are binding," but this exception is ap-
plied most generally to the acquisition of property.2 More certainly
though, a minor can bind himself in "contracts for necessaries.' '3 These
contracts include such items as food, lodging, clothing and other things
"essential to life and comfort."" The Virginia court has not addressed the
question of whether medical treatment is a necessary, but other jurisdic-
tions39 have held that medical services are not necessaries if the minor
resides in his parents' home and there is no showing that the parents
refused or neglected to support the child." There are no reported cases that
have specifically considered whether mental health care, family planning,
substance abuse or treatment for venereal disease is, in fact, a "necessary."
It is doubtful whether these services would be considered as such in light
of those cases that have refused to acknowledge medical treatment as being
a "necessary."
'4'
The unemancipated minor is not foreclosed from obtaining treatment
simply because of his infancy and the lack of consent by the parent, but
may receive aid through state and federally-funded programs as an indi-
gent. 41 Currently, federal law requires that a minor be automatically classi-
fied as indigent in cases involving alcohol and substance abuse. It would
appear that state facilities would be able to grant similar status to minors
for the treatment of venereal disease or mental health disorders. But, it is
unclear at this time whether state funds could be used to provide family
planning services beyond giving information on family planning and issu-
36. 9B MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE, Infants § 4 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
37. In such contracts, the minor is not bound by the express contract, but rather on an
implied contract to pay the reasonable value of goods or services rendered. A mere recital in
a contract that the goods or services provided are necessaries, does not preclude scrutiny by
a court of the actual nature of goods or services. See generally, Bear v. Bear, 131 Va. 447,
109 S.E. 313 (1921); 42 AM. JUR. 2D, Infants §§ 65, 67 (1969).
38. Cf., Gordon, Infant's Liability for Legal Services, 6 WM. & MRY L. REv. 105 (1965)
(discussing attorney's fees as necessaries).
39. Foster v. Adcock, 161 Tenn. 217, 30 S.W.2d 239 (1930); Cole v. Wagner, 197 N.C. 692,
150 S.E. 339 (1929).
40. Where the life of the child is in jeopardy the state, under the doctrine of parens patriae,
may intervene. It is still doubtful at this point who would bear the cost of the medical
procedures when the parents refuse consent based on religious or philosophical grounds. See
e.g., Comment, 28 RoCKY MTN. L. REv. 235 (1956).
41. See notes 37-40, supra and accompanying text.
42. See Drug Abuse and Treatment Act of 1972, 21 U.S.C. § 1176 (1976); Comprehensive
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 4576 (1976). Cf.: Public Health Service, 42 C.F.R. § 54 a. 103 (1978) which states:
"... no person in the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
[Vol. 13:915
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ing contraceptives. Although the Supreme Court has recognized the
minor's right to an abortion"3 there is no requirement for the state to
provide funding for such treatment."
2. Who has access to medical records?
Even though a child may now seek and receive treatment for mental
disorders, it is possible that the new law will not adequately insure his
privacy. Currently, if the minor receives treatment in a publicly funded
mental health facility, the parents would have access to those health re-
cords under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act.45 Under this provi-
sion the minor could not protect access to the records from his parents or
guardians.
Under the new law," a child would exercise his right to consent to mental
health care when he wished to preserve his privacy or when such treatment
was opposed by the parents. Unless the Freedom of Information Act is
amended, however, a mental health professional could not guarantee that
the confidences of a minor could be withheld from the parent. The parent
who vigorously opposes such treatment may harass and disrupt any pro-
gram of care or therapy by instituting Freedom of Information requests or
suits,"7 and thus destroy any possible private or confidential relationship
between the physician, or mental health care professional, and the minor
patient. Such interference would defeat the very purpose for which the new
statute was intended-to provide the minor with a means of obtaining
health services while recognizing a certain right to privacy.
The minor who participates in a treatment program administered by a
43. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See notes 20-21, supra, and
accompanying text.
44. See, Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (held that medicaid program under Title XIX
does not require a state to underwrite the cost of "non-theraputic" abortions); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977) (held that even though a state provides childbirth-related services there
is "no obligation on the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent
women"). The Court decided Beal on statutory grounds and Maher on constitutional grounds.
For a more complete discussion of these cases see Note, Beal, Maher and Poelber: The End
of An Era?, 17 J. OF FAis. L. 49 (1978).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342(b)(3) (Rep. Vol. 1979) states in part:
Where the person who is the subject of scholastic or medical and mental records is
under the age of eighteen, his right of access [to his records] may be asserted only by
his parent or guardian ....
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See notes 1-5, supra, and accompanying
text.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-346 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
48. See notes 24-25, supra, and accompanying text.
1979]
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private physician would generally be protected from disclosures of infor-
mation under Virginia's physician-patient communications statute." It
should be noted, however, that this privilege is very limited and in civil
actions, such as commitment proceedings or custody disputes, the court
may "in the exercise of sound discretion" require such disclosures when
"necessary to the proper administration of justice."0 Thus, a court could
require a physician to divulge all relevant information at; to the mental
health status of the minor in a civil proceeding on such im issue."'
It is also unclear at this point whether a person enrolled in joint counsel-
ling or "group therapy" retains the right to physician-patient communi-
cation privilege. A recent Virginia circuit court decision 2 held that, at
least between husband and wife involved in joint counselling, there is no
privileged communication. Thus, if tested, the physician-patient privilege
might also be abrogated. This would again jeopardize a child's right to
privacy, since a common means of resolving adolescent problems is
through group therapy and social interaction."
3. Can a child withhold consent to treatment?
The final issue that this new statute"4 raises, but fails to answer, is
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
50. Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 443, 616-18 (1964) (advising use
of psychiatric reports in child custody disputes and documenting the use of such reports by
the states). The court may determine that the mental health of the minor is at issue in
custody disputes. In an effort to determine which parent the child prefers, or with which
parent the child is more comfortable, the court may require a health care profesisonal to
testify on any therapy that might reveal such facts. This destroys the confidentiality that a
patient has a right to expect, and could greatly reduce any real expectation of privacy. For
an excellent discussion of Virginia's physician-patient communication privilege, see W. BRY-
SON, DISCOVERY IN VIRGINIA (1978) and W. BRYSON, NoTrS ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE (1979).
51. Even though the physician or group leader might be required to divulge this informa-
tion, it is doubtful whether the court could demand that the records themselves be permitted
in the case of custody proceedings. However, where the medical health of the minor is in direct
controversy, i.e., civil commitment proceedings, the court could require such records to be
produced under Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 4:10 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
52. Haut v. Haut, No. 54404 (Fairfax Co. Cir. Ct., Dec. 14, 1978, held that "when a
husband and wife are in a counselling session with a psychiatrist which is between the
husband and wife, there is no confidentiality because the statements were made not in private
to a doctor. ... ). See, Psychiatric News, May 4, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
53. This group therapy most commonly involves: (1) activity therapy; and (2) group psy-
choanalysis. Activity therapy is an analytically oriented group method for treating children
between the ages of 7 and 11 with disturbed peer relationships. Group psychoanalysis is used
both for adolescents and adults, and involves the patient's transference and resistance feel-
ings of increased complexity and helps participants to resume normal interactions in society.
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 384 (3d ed. P. Soloman and V. Patch 1974).
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
[Vol. 13:915
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whether or not a child who may consent to treatment may also withhold
that consent and thus preclude parental "right to consent." This problem
involves the entire relationship of the rights of the parent over the child
and the question of the permissible constitutional infringements on the
substantive rights of minors. 5 There must be established specific constitu-
tional limits on the state's sanctioning of parental rights at the expense of
children's rights. The right of parents to control the affairs of a minor child
is necessary when dealing with pre-adolescents and minors adjudged men-
tally incompetent. In these instances the parent must retain broad discre-
tion. Once the child develops some maturity, however, he ought to be
allowed to influence his own destiny. The legislature should consider this
question and provide some guidance to both medical practitioners and
laymen alike. One author has devised a three part analysis to determine
whether a child should be allowed to become involved in selecting his own
treatment process. 6 The determination hinges upon: (1) the extent to
which the parent's decision intrudes on the constitutional rights of the
child; (2) the extent to which the underlying parental purpose in seeking
the treatment is a valid expression of parental authority; and (3) the extent
to which the child is capable of making his own choice.57 This might require
an administrative review by the court if a child feels that his personal
constitutional rights have been threatened by unilateral action on the part
of his parents. But, by requiring a hearing or administrative review, the
state can preserve and enforce an articulable standard of children's rights.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The new statute is innovative and a significant step forward for Virginia.
The General Assembly has demonstrated a progressive and realistic view
of the problems of adolescents who are seeking to make the difficult transi-
tion to adulthood. This law represents a recognition of a minor's constitu-
tional right to a degree of personal privacy. There is no complete abroga-
tion of the rights and responsibilities of the parents, but rather recognition
of a minor's right to give, or not give, consent to certain medical treatment.
This enlightened piece of legislation is not, however, without its weak-
nesses. The General Assembly must now consider when a child is capable
of providing informed consent and when a child may be able to withhold
that consent over a parent's desires for treatment. Additionally, a minor's
55. See notes 19-20, supra, and accompanying text. See also, Parham v. J. R., 99 S.Ct. 2493
(1979).
56. Note, The Mental Hospitalization of Children and the Limits of Parental Authority,
88 YALE L.J. 186 (1978).
57. Id. at 216.
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right to privacy, clearly recognized by the courts, must be further protected
by limiting access to medical records of the consenting minor. Also, we
must insure that the minor is not deprived of health se~rvices due to an
inability to pay. The child should be able to obligate himself contractually
for services, or freely use the benefits of the parents' health care program.
State-sponsored services should be used when applicable. These problems
should be addressed in the next session of the General Assembly.
This new legislation has provided a substantive framework that can
easily be refined and made even more effective by providing a comprehen-
sive progran that will include all health care services and not just those
currently addressed.
John V. Cogbill III
